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DFID evidence papers  
DFID uses a range of evidence synthesis approaches to address the challenge of providing 
decision makers with the evidence that they need to make better choices.  
 
The “Evidence paper” is an expression of the opinion that DFID has of the existing evidence 
on a given subject.  
 
This paper, written by staff members of DFID, provides a summary of evidence underpinning 
a range of debates related to Agriculture and the Private Sector. 
 
The authors do not attempt to prescribe policy conclusions, which, for DFID, will appear 
elsewhere. This is not a policy document, and is not meant to represent DFID's policy 
position.  
 
 
5 
 
Evidence summary – 
Agriculture and the private 
sector 
 Direct state interventions in agricultural input and output markets, in particular 
public control of markets, is likely to produce inefficient and inequitable outcomes 
– Theory asserts the state cannot allocate resources as efficiently as well-functioning 
markets and that state control over production and marketing is prone to elite capture. 
The secondary literature suggests a degree of consensus that public interventions can 
crowd out private sector investment but few empirical studies verify this assertion.  
 
 Private sector investment alone is not enough to stimulate agricultural growth – 
Theory and strong empirical evidence indicates both public and private interventions and 
investments are needed to create sustained agricultural growth. The extent to which the 
state should provide more than public goods and a conducive policy environment is 
contested.    
 
 Effective agricultural growth strategies are likely to require simultaneous and 
complementary public and private investments that support segments of value 
chains in an integrated way – Both theory and a moderate evidence base suggests the 
right sequencing of public and private sector investment is critical to unlocking the 
potential of agricultural markets. This approach aims to mitigate both state and market 
failures by providing checks and incentives for the state and private sector to work 
together in mutually beneficial and effective partnerships. Whilst there is a clear 
consensus that complementary public/private investments are needed, the precise mix is 
governed by different country contexts, regions, crops, smallholder types and regional 
characteristics, suggesting a suite of policies and programmes.  
 
 The commercialisation of agriculture provides opportunities for the growth of 
agro-industries but equitable outcomes for smallholders are not guaranteed – Both 
producer organisations and contract farming can facilitate smallholder market access and 
commercialisation. A strong evidence base suggests smallholder participants in 
contracting schemes are from the wealthiest strata of rural communities and that the 
poorest smallholders tend to be excluded. The available empirical evidence suggests 
contract participants enjoy significantly higher incomes than non-participants but further 
research is required. Theory and a moderate evidence base support the contention that 
contract-farming arrangements are usually entered into by large firms which supply 
export markets and supermarkets in urban centres.  
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The agriculture and growth 
evidence paper series  
Agriculture is and will continue to be critical to the futures of many developing countries. This 
may or may not be because agriculture can contribute directly and/or indirectly to economic 
growth. But it will certainly be critical because poverty is still predominantly a rural 
phenomenon and this looks set to remain for the next two decades at least.  
 
The agriculture and growth evidence paper series has been developed to cover a range of 
issues that are of most relevance to DFID staff. The first 5 topics that will be covered by this 
series are shown below.  However, as further issues are identified so further papers will be 
commissioned.    
 
Agriculture and growth 
 Agricultural growth and the national 
economy 
 Agriculture’s contribution to economic 
growth 
 Agricultural growth and structural 
transformation 
Food prices and poverty  
 Is there such a thing as an optimum 
staple food price or food price trend 
relative to other prices or income? 
 Food price spikes and poor 
households 
Agriculture and poverty  
 Agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction  
 Agricultural growth vs. growth in other 
sectors  
 Value for money of agricultural 
growth 
 Contextual influences of agricultural 
growth and poverty reduction 
Agriculture and the private sector  
 Direct state involvement in 
agricultural input and output markets.  
 The role of the public sector in 
supporting private sector investment 
 Opportunities for commercialisation 
of agriculture 
Agriculture and women 
 The impact of agricultural growth on 
women 
 The impact of women on agricultural 
growth 
 
 
How to use this paper  
The paper is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all issues relating to agriculture 
and the private sector.  It concentrates on those areas that are of particular focus for DFID 
policy and strategy. 
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The search strategy for the evidence is shown in annex 2.  The objective of this search 
strategy was to identify the range of evidence that is indicative of the body of evidence that 
underpins the statements that are included throughout this paper. The evidence includes 
qualitative and quantitative evidence from both peer reviewed and grey sources.    
 
All papers directly referred to within this evidence paper are described and assessed (where 
appropriate) in accordance with the DFID How to note Assessing the strength of evidence 
(see annex 3 for a summary of appraisal criteria). These assessments are undertaken by the 
author and are intended to act as a guide for the reader. While guided by a systematic 
assessment framework they are subjective and cannot be taken as the definitive assessment 
of the quality of the research that the evidence is based on. Efforts have been made by the 
editor to ensure that the methods and approach to the evidence assessment have been 
consistent across the papers in this series.   
 
The descriptors that are used to articulate this assessment are summarised in the tables 
below.  
 
Table 1: Descriptors of research type and design 
Research type Research design 
Primary and Empirical (P&E) 
Experimental (EXP) 
Observational (OBS) 
Secondary (S) 
Systematic review (SR) 
Other review (OR) 
Theoretical or conceptual (TC) N/A 
 
Table 2: Descriptors of research quality 
Study 
quality 
Abbreviation What might this mean… 
High ↑ 
Demonstrates adherence to principles of 
appropriateness/rigour, validity and reliability; likely to 
demonstrate principles of conceptual framing, openness/ 
transparency and cogency. 
Moderate → 
Some deficiencies in appropriateness/rigour, validity 
and/or reliability, or difficulty in determining these; may 
or may not demonstrate principles of conceptual framing, 
openness/transparency and cogency. 
Low ↓ 
Major and/or numerous deficiencies in 
appropriateness/rigour, validity and reliability; may/may 
not demonstrate principles of conceptual framing, 
openness/ transparency and cogency. 
 
The synthesis of evidence and description of the overall “evidence base” are based on 
combining this grading of strength of the individual pieces with three other characteristics: the 
size of the total body of evidence assessed; the context/s in which this evidence is set (local, 
regional or global); and the consistency of the findings produced by the studies constituting 
the body of evidence.  
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1. State interventions in 
agricultural input and 
output markets  
Theoretical and conceptual overview 
One body of theoretical and conceptual literature argues that the emergence of a dynamic 
private sector has been hampered by state bodies continuing to fulfil basic functions in 
agricultural markets. This has reduced incentives for the private sector to invest in market 
infrastructure and limited the potential for regional trade. This literature asserts that 
discretionary and unpredictable trade controls – such as import and export bans and ad hoc 
changes in tariffs – as well as direct state involvement in agricultural input and output 
markets, through price subsidies and parastatals, are most likely to product inefficient and 
inequitable outcomes as they distort market signals and incentives.1 
 
The main argument is that the public sector cannot allocate resources optimally and state 
controls over production and marketing activities are prone to elite capture.2  Based partly on 
the post-colonial experience in sub-Saharan Africa, this literature asserts that state-controlled 
trading and financing up until the early 1980s did not stimulate rapid increases in agricultural 
growth, the operations of marketing boards proved costly and inefficient, and that subsidised 
inputs and products often did not reach those in most need, often ending up in the hands of 
medium-large farmers or state-sponsored actors.3 This body of literature maintains that the 
market liberalisation process should be completed, supported with complementary 
investment in public goods and regulatory reform and support to vulnerable groups (World 
Bank, 2000, [TC]). 
 
A contrasting theoretical literature agrees that state interventions in markets have been 
inefficient but challenges the conclusion that too little liberalisation has been the only cause 
of weak growth.4 This body points to significant state interventions in input and credit 
markets, combined with price control mechanisms, in many countries that did experience 
sustained agricultural growth. It argues that high transaction costs combined with weak non-
market coordination mechanisms underlie observed failures in some agricultural produce and 
                                            
 
1
 (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR]), (Jayne et al 2010 [P&E; OBS →]),  (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), 
(Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Xu et al [P&E; OBS ↑]) (World Bank, 2000, [TC]) 
2
 (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR]), ( Jayne et al 2010 [P&E; OBS →]),  (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]) 
3
 (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]) 
4 (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004a [S, OR]), (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR])  
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service markets.5 Based on this explanation of market failures, creating a conducive policy 
environment and the provision of public goods alone are necessary but insufficient conditions 
for investment and growth in some markets and some form of non-market coordination or 
intervention is necessary to raise investments and transaction volumes to the threshold 
necessary for a market-based growth path (see section on ‘The role of the public sector in 
supporting private sector involvement’ for further discussion).  
 
Empirical evidence 
Secondary literature indicates some consensus around the notions that direct state 
involvement is likely to produce inefficient outcomes, but there are few empirical studies that 
verify this assertion. Of the 8 studies reviewed,
6
 only 2 drew from cross-country 
comparisons.
7 Within the 9 studies, only 4 papers were of medium/high quality.
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The outcomes from this body of research are:  
 
Theoretical studies tend to concur that state direct intervention produces sub-optimal 
outcomes, but only a subset of these theoretical studies have supporting primary 
empirical evidence. The majority of studies that draw this conclusion are based on 
secondary data and analysis.  
 
Drawing from case studies of agricultural market liberalisation in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, Jayne et al (2002 [S; OR]) maintain that during the 1980s and 1990s 
policy unpredictability led to the crowding out of private sector involvement and slowed a 
supply-side response, whilst state interventions favoured political constituencies. Many of 
these countries did not implement market reforms, others subsequently reversed reforms or 
implemented them in a way that discouraged private sector investment. For example, in 
Zimbabwe price controls remained in place, in Zambia government continued to subsidize 
fertiliser undercutting private sector distribution systems, in Ethiopia members of the ruling 
party controlled who should receive fertiliser, and in Kenya and Malawi state-owned 
marketing boards were actively engaged in supporting producer prices and delivering free 
starter input packs. Based on this evidence, it is argued that countries in Eastern and 
Southern Africa which abolished marketing boards and shed interventions fared better than 
those who have only implemented de jure reform.  
 
Using nationwide household survey data, Xu et al (2009 [P&E; OBS ↑]) study the impact of 
fertiliser subsidies in Zambia using a double hurdle model to estimate overall fertiliser use in 
                                            
 
5 Agricultural investments are contingent on simultaneous, complementary investments by other actors along the value 
chain. ‘Coordination risks’, the risk of investing in one component of a supply chain when other actors may not make 
complementary investments, and ‘risks of opportunism’, the risk of another actor exploiting their local monopoly may be 
so high that at least one set of actors in the supply chain is unwilling or unable to make the necessary minimum 
investment or to offersufficiently attractive terms for the transaction. The whole market thus becomes locked in a ‘low-
level equilibrium trap’ (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004a [S, OR]). 
6
 (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR]), (Jayne et al 2010 [P&E; OBS →]),  (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), 
(Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Xu et al [P&E; OBS ↑]) 
(World Bank, 2000, [TC]) 
7
 (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR]), (Mason et al, 2013, [P&E; OBS ↑]) 
8
 (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]) (Xu et al [P&E; OBS ↑]), (Jayne et al 2010 [P&E; OBS →]) 
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dual markets where government subsidies and private retailers co-exist. The evidence 
suggests government programs targeted relatively wealthy farmers and male-headed 
households with larger landholdings. Recipient households are also more likely to be in 
areas of higher private-sector activity, thus depressing commercial demand and reducing the 
overall use of fertilisers. 
 
Based on nationally representative household-level data from Malawi and Zambia, Mason et 
al (2013 [P&E; OBS ↑]) find that households in areas where the ruling party won the last 
presidential election acquired significantly more subsidised inputs than other households. 
The result of their studies indicate that households with larger landholdings received 
significantly more subsidised fertiliser in Malawi and slightly more subsidised seed in Zambia. 
The authors also observed that each additional kilogram of subsidised maize seed acquired 
by a household reduced its commercial improved maize seed purchases by 0.58 kg in 
Malawi and 0.49 kg in Zambia on average. This supports the view that subsidies for 
improved maize seed crowded out commercial seed purchases by smallholders and that 
some of the subsidized inputs are targeted to households that would otherwise buy the 
inputs at market prices. 
 
More recently, assessment of the distribution of fertiliser vouchers in sub-Saharan Africa 
echo previous concerns with elite capture and politicisation. For example, Pan and 
Christiansen (2011, [P&E; OBS]) found weak decentralised targeting in Tanzania with poor 
households in outlying areas most affected, whilst Banful (2011, [P&E; OBS]) found evidence 
of the politicisation of voucher targeting in Ghana. Moreover, reflecting Xu et al’s study (2009 
[P&E; OBS]), Mason et al (2011; P&E; OBS) found that the gains from Zambia’s fertiliser 
subsidy were mostly enjoyed by smallholders with larger landholdings. 
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2. The role of the public 
sector in supporting 
private sector 
involvement  
Theoretical and conceptual overview 
The view that the private sector alone cannot boost agricultural growth is supported in 
multiple conceptual and empirical studies.9 Indeed, the overwhelming consensus is that both 
public and private investments are needed to create sustained agricultural sector growth. 
However, across the literature the desired levels of state involvement moves along a 
spectrum ranging from light touch and enabling to proactive and coordinating. The majority 
would seem to acknowledge the importance of country context when assessing the level of 
state involvement that is required.    
 
Examples of the arguments at different points along this spectrum are: 
Creation of a conducive policy environment and the provision of public goods.10 
Governments should create a conducive policy environment and invest in rural public goods, 
in particular physical infrastructure (rural roads, electricity, irrigation) and research and 
extension services.11 The state’s role in providing macroeconomic stability, an effective legal 
framework (contract enforcement, land tenure systems), streamlined business regulations, 
and tax and customs policies are thought to be critical to encourage large-scale private 
sector investments and to expand markets and trade.12  
Moving further along the spectrum, a body of literature makes the case for the state to also 
play an active market coordination role to overcome market failures and facilitate 
private investment in thin markets.13 This view is more sceptical of the extent to which 
liberalisation has delivered efficient and effective mechanisms of market exchange in poor 
rural areas.14 It is argued that the private sector response to market liberalisation has been 
                                            
 
9
  (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004a [S, OR →]), (Dorward et al, 2004b [S; OR]), (Poulton et al, 2006 [S; OR 
→]),  (Jayne et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]), (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), (Diop et al, 2005 [P&E; OBS →]), (Narrod et al, 2009 
[S; OR]), (Spielman et al, 2007 [P&E; OBS →]), (Berdegue et al, 2008 [P&E; OBS]) (Fan et al, 2003 [S; OR]), (Pingali et al, 2005 
[S; OR]), (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Moseley, 2010 [P&E;OBS ↓]), (Chamberlin & Jayne, 
2013 [P&E; OBS →]), (Langyintuo et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]) 
10
 (Fan et al, 2003 [S; OR]), (Pingali et al, 2005 [S; OR]) 
11
 (Jayne et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]),  (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; 
OR]) 
12
 (Poulton et al, 2006 [S; OR →]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Narrod et al, 2009 [S; OR]), (Pingali et al, 2005 [S; OR]) 
13
 (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004b [S; OR]) 
14
  (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]) 
12 
 
slow and risk averse. For example, private provision of inputs and finance has been sluggish 
and patchy, and investment in export crops has been more common than food crops.  In 
addition, uncertainty and high transactions costs are likely to result in the purchase of fewer 
inputs, uptake of less credit, and the marketing of less produce than indicated by economic 
fundamentals, creating ‘low level equilibrium traps’ in rural areas, where bottlenecks at one 
stage of the supply chain depress incentives for investment at other stages (Dorward et al, 
2004a [S, OR →]).  
Therefore, to correct market failures, a more strategic role needs to be played by the state, 
providing incentives for private sector actors to transform value chains (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; 
OBS→]). It is argued that experiences from Latin America and South Asia demonstrate that 
the public sector must be proactive in setting priorities but that it must exercise caution to 
avoid overstepping its capacity, creating distorting incentives, or fostering an environment 
that favours rent-seeking. For example, it is widely recognised the Green Revolution in India 
was a state-driven, market-mediated growth process (Djurfeldt et al 2005, [P&E; OBS]). 
However, whilst short-term subsidies were important for the adoption of new technologies, in 
the medium- to long-term such policies became inefficient.15  
 
Empirical evidence 
A literature of 21 studies has been identified that consistently argues for some level of public 
sector support to agriculture.16 However, the body of empirical evidence that we have 
reviewed is of a small size (5 studies) and of moderate quality.17  
 
The first 2 studies indicate that more is required from governments than market 
liberalisation policies alone.  
Moseley (2010 [P&E;OBS]) used household and market surveys and analysed national-level 
production data from Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire and Mali for his study on the rice sector. He 
contends that market liberalisation policies disproportionately favour urban consumers at the 
expense of rural producers. His findings suggest that credit systems, road networks, and 
milling/processing capacity are more important than improved seed packages and production 
expansion to get crops to markets. 
Based on an empirical study of over 90 percent of all maize seed providers in Eastern and 
Southern Africa in 2007, Langyintuo et al (2010 [P&E; OBS →]) argue that major bottlenecks 
in credit, access to germplasm and restrictions to seed trade deterred greater private sector 
involvement in seed production and deployment. They argue that policy/regulatory 
                                            
 
15
 (Cummings et al 2006, [S, OR]), (Fan et al, 2008 [P&E; OBS]). 
16
  (Dorward et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004a [S, OR →]), (Dorward et al, 2004b [S; OR]), (Poulton et al, 2006 [S; OR 
→]),  (Jayne et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]), (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), (Diop et al, 2005 [P&E; OBS →]), (Narrod et al, 2009 
[S;OR]), (Spielman et al, 2007 [P&E; OBS →]), (Berdegue et al, 2008 [P&E; OBS]) (Fan et al, 2003 [S; OR]), (Pingali et al, 2005 
[S; OR]), (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]), (Moseley, 2010 [P&E;OBS ↓]), (Chamberlin & Jayne, 
2013 [P&E; OBS →]), (Langyintuo et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]) (Fan et al, 2003 [S; OR]), (Pingali et al, 2005 [S; OR]), (Poulton et 
al 2012 [S; OR]),  (Spielman et al, 2010 [S; OR]) 
17
 (Moseley, 2010 [P&E;OBS; ↓]), (Langyintuo et al, 2010 [P&E; OBS →]), (Fan et al, 2003 [S; OR]), (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; 
OBS→]), (Chamberlin & Jayne, 2013 [P&E;OBS;→]) 
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improvements are needed to provide long-term finance to the seed sector and legislation 
should be harmonised for the more rapid regional spillover of seed varietal releases.  
 
The other studies demonstrate the benefits that can come from varying degrees of 
public sector support for agriculture. 
 
In an analysis of government expenditure and agricultural data (drawn from IMF, WB and 
FAO databases) for 43 developing countries (Asia, Africa, Latin America) from 1980 to 1998, 
Fan et al (2003 [S; OR]) found that government agricultural  expenditure contributed strongly 
to agricultural growth. The provision of public goods in the form of roads, irrigation and 
education (proxied by literacy rates) all had positive and statistically significant effects. 
Disaggregating total agricultural expenditure into research and non-research expenditure 
components, revealed that although both their coefficients are positive, the coefficient for 
agricultural research is larger in magnitude and more significant, suggesting that productivity-
enhancing expenditures, such as agricultural research investment, have larger output-
promoting effects than other forms of public spending on agriculture (including subsidies). 
 
Using a survey of 3,500 farmers operating in rice and potato value chains in India, 
Bangladesh and China, Reardon et al (2012 [P&E; OBS→]) confirm that the state has been 
instrumental in fostering private-sector involvement through investments in research and 
development, the distribution of seeds, infrastructure, cold storage facilities and electricity 
grids.  The removal of restrictions on medium- and large-scale millers allowed foreign direct 
investment in processing and retailing, leading towards greater economies of scale and 
market consolidation.  
 
Lastly, in a study of farm panel survey data on 1,233 farm households in 22 districts of Kenya 
between 1997-2010, Chamberlin and Jayne (2013 [P&E;OBS;→]) argue that cell-phones and 
new technologies lower transaction costs by improving traders’ ability to cultivate more 
spatially-diffuse networks and make use of faster price-discovery and negotiation times. 
Their findings suggest that investments in telecommunications rather than road infrastructure 
could be more efficient for lowering the costs of trade in remote areas. 
  
14 
 
3. What type of partnership 
between public sector 
and private sector lead to 
better results? 
 
Theoretical and conceptual overview 
Multiple conceptual and theoretical papers support the argument that effective agricultural 
growth strategies need to draw on combined public and private investments that support 
various segments of the value chain in a complementary manner.18 A strand of the 
conceptual literature asserts that the right sequencing of public and private sector investment 
is critical in unlocking the potential of agricultural markets. Based on the success of the 
Green Revolution, Dorward et al (2004b [S; OR]) postulate a three-phased approach: first, 
establish the basics through state-led infrastructure investment; second, kick-start markets 
through critical government interventions in seasonal finance and input supply systems; and 
third, government withdrawal from these markets for the private sector to take over.  
 
Similarly, Spielman (2010 [S; OR]) maintains that agricultural reforms require careful 
sequencing to maintain short-term public engagement in input markets and extension 
services whilst creating new space for long-term private investment. This way the 
inefficiencies of public extension services caused by poor incentives can be overcome by 
attracting private agents whose technical advice to farmers is tied to their interest of selling 
inputs. Initial support can be justified by the high start-up costs and risks associated with 
developing new agricultural value chains and such support is often considered as 
instrumental in underwriting the high transaction costs of linking investors to smallholders 
(World Bank, 2013, [S; OR]). Some argue that strategic subsidies for inputs such as fertiliser 
may be needed in the early stages of market development but the way these subsidies are 
designed matters: targeted, time-bound input vouchers redeemed through private dealers 
can be important in building private input markets and stimulating growth in new crops. 
 
Dorward et al (2004a [S, OR →]) emphasise the importance of new developmental 
approaches that recognise possible failures of both states and markets and craft innovative 
                                            
 
18
 (Dorward et al, 2004a [S, OR]), (Dorward et al, 2004b [S, OR]), (Poulton et al, 2006 [S; OR]), (Poulton et al 2012 [S; OR]) 
(Wiggins & Keates, 2012 [S; OR]), (Delaney et al, 2011 [S; OR]), (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]), (Diop et al, 2005 [P&E; OBS 
→]), (Spielman et al, 2007 [P&E; OBS →]), (Narrod et al, 2009 [S; OR]), (Poulton et al, 2006 [S; OR →]), (Dorward et al, 2005 
[S; OR]), (World Bank, 2013, [S; OR]), (Chirwa, 2008 [P&E; OBS →]), (Xu et al, 2009 [P&E; OBS ↑]), (Leturque & Wiggins, 
2011 [S, OR])
 
, (Jayne et al, 2002 [S; OR]) 
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institutional arrangements providing checks and incentives for states and for commercial and 
non-state agents to work together. Moreover, Poulton and Macartney (2012 [S; OR]) 
examine whether the incentives of the private sector can be aligned to meet public policy 
objectives. The authors conclude that the private sector can be stimulated to deliver public 
outcomes if incentives are in place to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection. Potential 
safeguards include contract cancellation, performance-based payments, partial credit loss 
guarantees, competitive bidding and due diligence. However, the authors are sceptical of the 
capacity of many African state agencies, in particular, to effectively structure contracts in 
these ways.  
 
Empirical evidence 
18 studies have been identified that consistently argue for the role of complementary 
investments.19 Empirical evidence is limited (8 studies)20 and of moderate to poor quality. 
This evidence indicates a consensus that complementary public/private investments are 
needed, but the nature of this is governed by geographical, developmental and 
economic context. Different types of complementarities are thought to be suitable for 
different country contexts, regions, crops, smallholder types and high/low potential areas, 
suggesting a suite of policies and programmes.21  
 
In the study of the impact of fertiliser subsidies in Zambia, Xu et al (2009 [P&E; OBS ↑]) find 
that the impact of the fertilizer subsidy program on overall fertilizer use depends on the type 
of area in which the program operates. In areas where the private sector was active and 
average wealth higher, subsidies have crowded out the private sector and in some cases 
government programmes reduced overall fertiliser use. Feedback from commercial 
distributors indicated that they wait to see where government programs are operating and the 
quantities to be distributed in a particular year and then arrange to distribute their fertilizer to 
other areas which will not compete with the government programs. However, in poorer 
regions with limited private sector involvement, subsidies have helped to encourage greater 
commercial demand for fertilizer and hence the development of a commercial input 
distribution system. 
 
In developing cold chain storage facilities in India, government research and development in 
potato varieties and extension services for the new varieties were combined with tube well 
and cold chain storage subsidies and major investments in road improvements, power grid, 
and communications networks. Individually, these actions may not have worked well but 
taken together they were successful (Reardon, 2012 [P&E; OBS→]).  
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Case studies compiled by Wiggins and Keates (2012 [S; OR]) confirm that a large and formal 
firm (processor, exporter, retail outlet) often takes responsibility for organising value chain 
linkages. On a broader note, Leturque and Wiggins (2011 [S, OR]) suggest that Thailand’s 
success in transitioning from an agrarian economy dependent on primary exports to taking 
up opportunities in domestic and international markets for higher value produce has been 
down to private initiative, but the state facilitated and encouraged this by land tenure rules, 
the building of roads, investments in agricultural research and rural education, provision of 
credit through state-owned banks and the promotion of agricultural exports. The government 
was also instrumental in establishing public and semi-public agribusiness companies and in 
facilitating contract farming schemes. 
 
Based on a FAO review of 70 case studies of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America, Rankin and Galvez Nogales (2013, [S; OR]) highlight the common 
challenges and constraints encountered within four types of PPPs: innovation and 
technology transfer; value chain/sub-sector development; market infrastructure; and agro-
industrial food parks. In addition to the importance of the design of the collaboration and the 
specific roles and responsibilities of actors, the common challenges encountered included a 
variety of institutional failures, operational delays and misunderstandings, technical failures 
as well as higher costs and lower returns than assumed. Kindornay et al (2013 [S; OR]) 
highlight how many models are driven by donors who provide matched funding or a further 
financial incentive to firms to introduce changes into their business models and supply 
chains.   
 
Such support has led to different types of partnerships: structured donor mechanisms (with 
strict conditions); semi- or non-structured donor-led models (which are less rigid and offer 
opportunities for more actors); public-private or multi-stakeholder coalitions (often aimed at a 
sector or specific value chain); and firm-led initiatives, including with non-profit organisations 
(Heinrich 2013, [S;OR]). Rigorous empirical evaluations of PPPs are at an early stage. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests hidden costs related to PPPs (especially for value-
chain PPPs) and the role of key enabling individuals are not fully understood(Boland 2012, 
[S; OR]). Moreover, and as already highlighted, Poulton and Macartney (2012 [S; OR]) 
highlight the inherent threats of moral hazard and adverse selection within PPPs in 
agriculture. For example, the threat of shirking within extension service contracts, low farmer 
acceptance of new products supported by challenge funds, and how guarantee funds can 
intensify competition within existing lucrative markets instead of expanding coverage to low-
potential areas and poorer consumers. Whilst the authors offer a suite of incentives and 
mechanisms to overcome the principal-agent problems, they question the capacity of the 
state in Africa to implement such safeguards. 
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4. Commercialisation of 
agriculture and 
opportunities for the 
growth of agro-industries 
and smallholders. 
 
Theoretical and conceptual overview  
Theory suggests that whilst commercialisation leads to broad agro-industrial growth, some 
smallholders may struggle to participate and benefit. Commercialisation occurs with rising 
incomes and growing (urban) markets demanding higher-value products. It also arises when 
agricultural exporters meet higher public and private standards within the global market. Both 
processes lead to the greater use of purchased inputs, greater demand for processing, 
packaging and transportation, and the increased use of services (for machinery repair, 
finance and retail) thereby adding value in downstream and, to a lesser extent, upstream 
nodes of value chains (World Bank, 2013, [S; OR]). This transformation of agriculture can 
create greater opportunities for some smallholder farmers. However, investment constraints, 
a lack of ability to meet standards, and high transaction costs can often limit broad 
smallholder participation. Smaller farms often suffer from capital constraints and lack 
capacity to adopt technological innovations (partly due to low literacy levels). For example, 
high perishability and safe handling involves specialised production, packaging techniques 
and refrigeration, large capital investments which small and medium-sized farms often 
cannot afford.22  Moreover, smallholders and small exporters often struggle to meet the 
precise product requirements from actors further down the value chain. For example, safety 
assurance, traceability, quality control, and credence factors are, in many cases, significant 
barriers to entry.23 Lastly, a widely-dispersed smallholder population also increase 
transaction costs for firms (compared to contracting with large farms).  
 
Producer organisations can reduce transaction costs per farmer and address information and 
communication blockages although collective action will also incur internal transaction costs 
within the producer organisation. Smallholder integration into more demanding value chains 
may be more successful where producer organisations can facilitate training, aggregation 
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and compliance with standards (World Bank, 2013, [S; OR]). Producer organisations can 
also: facilitate higher producer prices by supplying bulk quantities that have some quality 
assurance; adapt to market conditions faster by seeking alternative buyers; negotiate more 
effectively with prospective firms; and facilitate finance and technology by channelling 
outside actors to their members.24 In this respect, such organisations may play a dual role, 
acting as a bonding mechanism within communities, but also providing an important bridging 
function with outside actors (such as firms and development agencies).  
 
Contract farming is one approach for involving smallholders in agroindustry development, 
increasing employment and improving the inclusiveness of growth. Contract farming tends to 
involve a firm providing ‘inputs’ on credit in exchange for exclusive purchasing rights over the 
specified crop. Contract farming can reduce firms’ transaction costs and risks and provide an 
efficient means of sharing incentives and risks in some sub-sectors. Contract farming 
schemes are only likely to succeed where contracts can be enforced. In many developing 
countries with weak judicial processes and law enforcement institutions this is likely to be 
limited to circumstances where side-selling25 is difficult (e.g. where the contracting buyer has 
a monopsony) or unattractive (e.g. where buyers coordinate to disincentivise side-selling) ion 
among buyers result.  In terms of poverty reduction, contracting with smallholders can be 
beneficial: small farms are owned by the poor, often use local labour, and often spend 
income nearby. Moreover, in many developing countries, small farms may have advantages 
over large farms in terms of labour-related transaction costs, in particular supervision and 
motivation (Hazell et al, 2006 [TC]). 
 
For firms, contract farming can offer a number of opportunities: increased reliability in supply 
quantity and quality; greater control over the production process and crop attributes, to meet 
standards and credence factors; reduced co-ordination costs, as a more regular and stable 
supply permits greater co-ordination with wider activities; greater flexibility in expanding or 
reducing production compared to full vertical integration (and economies of scale in 
procurement of inputs). On a broader note, and especially where access to land is highly 
politicised, it can overcome land constraints.  
 
Contract farming also offers numerous opportunities for farms: it can allow access to a 
reliable market; it can provide guaranteed and stable pricing structures; and most 
importantly, it can provide access to credit, inputs, production and marketing services (seed, 
fertiliser, training, extension, transport, and even land preparation). On a wider note, contract 
farming can open doors to new markets for a farm’s produce, stimulate technology and skill 
transfer (particularly for higher-risk crops, which resource-poor farmers might typically avoid), 
and it can support farmers in meeting vital standards. 
 
The recent literature on contract farming with smallholders contains five key debates. First, 
the degree of smallholder participation in contracting schemes. The second debate is the 
impact of participation on smallholders’ incomes/welfare. Third, that crops exhibiting high 
variation in quality, that perish easily, that are hard to grow, or that command a higher price 
per kg are more likely to be grown through contract farming. The argument here is that 
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standard crops that have uniform quality and are not perishable are usually traded in spot 
markets since the transaction costs are low.  
 
Fourth, that contract-farming initiatives are usually undertaken by large firms. Minot (2007, 
[S; OR]) argues that such arrangements require substantial fixed costs, in particular a team 
of extension agents to engage, liaise and monitor farmers. Obviously, such fixed costs are 
easier for large firms to absorb. In addition, firms with large processing plants that require a 
steady flow of raw materials (sugarcane is a good example here, where out-growers 
supplement plantation production), tend to contract outgrowers.  
 
Fifth and finally, that contract-farming arrangements are most likely to supply markets in 
developed countries, and supermarkets within urban centres in other countries. The 
argument here is that greater demand for quality as well as credence factors tend to increase 
the likelihood that a crop is grown under contract. These markets are most likely to pay a 
premium for quality attributes.  
 
Contract farming can be seen to sit under a broader umbrella term of inclusive business 
models where smallholders are engaged by firms on ‘equitable’ terms ( Kelly, 2012 [S; OR]).  
This includes, inter alia, backwards integration by processors and forwards integration by 
input providers. Importantly, it also includes efforts by retailers, such as supermarkets, to 
include smallholders in their supply chains.26 In contrast to the specific literature on contract 
farming which focuses mainly on the potential for smallholder inclusion and benefits, the 
emergent literature on inclusive business models tends to focus more on the business case 
for incorporating smallholders within agroindustry development.27 Such models face 
significant challenges and high start-up costs in their initial phase.  
 
Empirical evidence 
Empirical studies are mixed on whether producer organisations improve smallholder 
participation. 5 studies of moderate quality were reviewed. Research in 8 countries found 
that membership of producer organisations was correlated with participation in modern 
markets in only half of the countries; in the rest the correlation was not significant or was 
negative (Huang and Reardon, 2008 [P&E; OBS →]). However, there is an agreement in the 
literature that the type of producer organisation matters: focusing on market-orientated, 
member-based POs that only provide benefits to members is preferable to broader 
community-based POs.28  
 
The type of commodity is also significant. Barrett (2008 [S; OR]) highlights how producer 
organisations have improved smallholder engagement with firms for cash crops, especially 
dairy and horticulture. However, there is limited evidence of successful PO intermediation for 
staple-food crops. One exception is Bernard et al (2010 [P&E; OBS]) who found that, on a 
non-contract basis, producer organisations obtained a 7% premium for members when 
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marketing staple-food produce (by utilising better market information, timing the sales of 
produce effectively, and moving into retails sales). But Bernard et al also highlight the 
frequent finding that poor, small farmers are not well-represented in staple-food producer 
organisations as the costs of membership are prohibitive. 
 
The empirical evidence on contract farming also displays a mixed and nuanced set of 
messages. In a synthetic review, Prowse (2012 [S; OR]) compares 44 cases of contract 
farming where 35 cases were assessed as ‘successful’, 9 as ‘failed’. The comparison of 
‘successful’ and ‘failed’ cases enabled Prowse to revisit the 5 debates outlined above. The 
evidence on the degree of smallholder participation in contract farming schemes suggests 
poorer smallholders are often excluded. 10 studies find low levels of participation by 
poorer smallholders.29 For example, Barrett (2008, [S; OR]) who finds a strong association 
between asset holdings, especially of land, and geographic factors (such as market access 
and agro-ecological zone) with participation.  Freguin-Gresh et al (2012, [P&E; OBS]) argue 
that although contract farming generally improves the agricultural production of 
participants, it often does not benefit the poorest. Results show that contract farming 
mostly involves the better resourced, who have previously benefitted from specific 
development paths and public support. Moreover, based on 1,200 households across 
regions and crops in Madagascar, Bellemare (2012 [P&E, OBS) shows that those 
participating in contract farming had larger landholdings, greater assets, better education and 
were more likely to be a member of a producer organisation. Taking these finds one step 
further, Wiggins and Keates (2012 [S; OR]) argue that marginal smallholders may find better 
prospects as wage labourers on larger farms instead of participating in improved supply 
chains as producers. 
 
In contrast, a more optimistic interpretation is offered by Reardon et al (2009 [S; OR]) who 
outline that although smallholders tend to be excluded in dualistic agrarian economies there 
are numerous exceptions to this pattern. In addition, Swinnen and Maertens (2007 [S; OR])  
posit that although theory suggests transaction costs and investment constraints imply that 
smallholders should be excluded from participating, empirical work suggests a much greater 
degree of participation.  
 
Of the 35 successful cases on contract farming assessed by Prowse 2012 [S; OR]), 54% (19 
total) of contracts were with small farms, and 26% (9 total) were with a combination of both 
small and large farms.30 When restricting the successful cases only to those studies that 
attempted to address selection bias, Prowse found 6 with small farms and 3 with a 
combination of small and large farms. But the extent of smallholder participation appears to 
be mediated by the agrarian structure: the review only found 2 instances – Colombia and 
Kenya – where landholding inequality is very high. All other successful cases had a more 
equal distribution of land. Therefore, the evidence suggests smallholders are more likely to 
participate in contract farming when inequality in landholding sizes is low. The 
evidence also suggests the poorest smallholders are less likely to participate in any agrarian 
context. 
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Second, recent evidence also lends strong support to the hypothesis that contract 
participants display significantly higher incomes than non-participants.31 For example, 
5 recent quasi-experimental studies all show significantly higher incomes for contract 
growers.32 The broader agribusiness literature supports these findings.33 However, this 
argument is still open to debate. Whilst recent empirical work has addressed selection bias at 
the household level (thus controlling for the observed characteristics of participants and non-
participants), there has been no discussion in the literature about controlling bias when 
selecting initiatives to evaluate. In other words, there is little surprise many contact-farming 
initiatives studied show increased incomes for participants compared to non-participants 
(ceteris paribus), for if they had not raised incomes the schemes may well have collapsed 
(and thus not be available to be studied). 
 
Third, recent evidence does suggest that crops which exhibit a high degree of variation in 
quality, perish easily, are hard to grow, or command a higher price per kg, are more 
likely to be grown on contract terms. However, there is also limited evidence to suggest that 
mundane and ordinary commodities can also be grown successfully via contract farming. For 
example, Prowse (2012 [S; OR]) highlights how successful cases of contract farming include 
apples, onions, potatoes, rice and soya. This finding is reflected in findings on the broader 
restructuring of staple food value chains in Asia.34  
 
Fourth, recent evidence supports the contention that contract-farming arrangements are 
usually entered into by large firms. Whilst it is easier for researchers to find and work with 
firms that are larger (and thus introduce a form of scheme-level selection bias), and there are 
examples of cases where small firms do engage successfully in contract farming, the weight 
of evidence tends to support this hypothesis.35  
 
And fifth, recent evidence supports the hypothesis that contract-farming initiatives are most 
likely to supply markets in developed countries, and supermarkets within urban centres 
in developing and emerging economies. For example, of the 35 ‘successful’ initiatives 
assessed by Prowse (2012 [S; OR]), 19 targeted export markets, 9 the local urban markets, 
with the remaining seven cases utilising a variety of markets, or did not clearly stating the 
end market. Focusing just on studies that address attribution and selection bias, eight out of 
ten initiatives were providing products for export markets.  
 
In addition to these 5 debates, Prowse (2012 [S; OR]) highlights how the recent literature 
includes various forms of innovation to encourage successful commercial production through 
contract farming. Innovations within contract design include penalty deductions/bonus 
payments at the end of the season depending on the extent to which production differed from 
the average for all growers, stipulating a third party to measure produce, or encouraging 
growers to produce food crops in parallel with a cash crop or in the off season. Financial 
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innovations included split-pricing schedules, growers receiving a small number of shares as 
part of a payment structure (to foster mutual interest and benefits), and using third-parties as 
a source of credit (with farmers’ collateral and the credit provider absorbing initial losses). 
Turning to institutions, both dispute-resolution agencies and intermediary organisations can 
provide services and support to make a breakdown in communication and co-operation less 
likely. 
 
Finally, the empirical evidence on inclusive business models is less well developed than 
that on contract farming. It also offers a very mixed assessment of smallholder benefits from 
involvement with agribusiness.  
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Annex 1:  Assessment summary 
Study Research 
Type 
Research 
Design 
Quality 
Banful (2011)  P&E OBS → 
Barrett (2008) S OR N/A 
Bellemare (2012) P&E OBS → 
Berdegué et al (2008) P&E OBS N/A 
Bernard et al (2006)  P&E OBS → 
Bernard et al (2010)  P&E OBS ↑ 
Bijman et al (2007)  S OR N/A 
Bijman (2008) S OR N/A 
Birthal et al (2005) P&E OBS → 
Birthal et al (2008) P&E OBS → 
Boland (2012) S OR N/A 
Bolwig et al (2009)  P&E OBS ↑ 
Bright and Seville (2010)   S OR N/A 
Chamberlin and  Jayne (2013) P&E OBS → 
Chirwa (2008) P&E OBS → 
Delaney et al (2011) S OR N/A 
Diop et al (2005) P&E OBS → 
Djurfeldt et al (2005)  P&E OBS → 
Dorward et al (2004a)  S OR N/A 
Dorward et al (2004b) S OR N/A 
Dorward et al  (2005) S OR N/A 
Fan and Rao (2003) S OR N/A 
Fan et al (2008)  P&E OBS → 
Friguin-Gresh et al (2012) P&E OBS → 
Giovanucci and Purcell (2008) S OR N/A 
Hazell et al (2006) TC N/A N/A 
Heinrich (2013)  S OR N/A 
Huang and Reardon (2008)  P&E OBS → 
Humphrey and Memedovic (2006) TC N/A N/A 
Jayne et al (2010) P&E  OBS → 
Jayne et al (2002) S OR N/A 
Kelly (2012) S OR N/A 
Key and Runsten (1999) P&E OBS → 
Kirsten and Satorius (2002) TC N/A N/A 
Kindornay et al (2013) S OR N/A 
Langyintuo et al (2010) P&E OBS → 
Leturque and Wiggins (2011) S OR N/A 
Lundy et al (2012) S OR N/A 
Mason et al (2011) 
Mason et al (2013) 
P&E 
P&E 
OBS 
OBS 
↑  
↑  
Mercoiret et al (2006)  S OR N/A 
Minot (2007) TC N/A N/A 
Minten et al (2009) P&E OBS ↑  
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Miyata et al (2009) P&E OBS ↑  
Moseley et al (2010) P&E OBS ↓ 
Narrod et al (2009) S OR N/A 
Paglietti and Sabrie (2013) S OR N/A 
Pan and Christiaensen (2012) P&E OBS ↑  
Pingali et al, 2005 S OR N/A 
Poulton et al, 2006 S OR N/A 
Poulton and Macartney, 2012 S OR N/A 
Prowse, M. (2012) S OR N/A 
Ramaswami et al (2005) P&E OBS → 
Rankin and Galvez Nogales (2013) S OR N/A 
Reardon et al (2012) P&E OBS → 
Reardon et al (2009) S OR N/A 
Setboonsarng et al (2008) P&E OBS → 
Singh et al (2002) P&E OBS ↓ 
Spielman et al (2007) P&E OBS → 
Spielman et al (2010) S OR N/A 
Swinnen and Maertens (2007) S OR N/A 
Wiggins and Keates (2012) S OR N/A 
World Bank (2000) TC N/A N/A 
World Bank (2013) S OR N/A 
Xu et al, 2009 P&E OBS ↑ 
 
 
Key: 
P&E: Primary and Empirical 
S: Secondary 
TC: Theoretical and conceptual 
EX: experimental 
OBS: Observational 
SR: Systematic review 
OR: Other review 
↑ High quality 
→ Medium quality 
↓ Low quality 
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Annex 2: Literature search methodology  
The interrogation of the evidence base for this paper was built on an iterative process 
designed to ensure that the paper covers a range of evidence that was indicative of the 
scope of the evidence base for each of the sections (that is, the full range of arguments and 
empirical research was represented). This included:  
 
A structured literature search of the following databases and repositories: 
 
 SviVerse Scopus 
 Web of Knowledge  
 Google Scholar  
 DFID’s research repository R4D  
 International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) systematic review and impact 
evaluation databases. 
 
The search was designed around search strings created for each of the sections. Further 
inclusion criteria for this rapid search were: 
 
 Date: after 2000 – present - unless considered seminal.  
 Languages - English 
 Population - developing countries  
 Region - no regional limitations.  
 
Focused searches by authors - The results of this search were used by authors to 
construct their theoretical and conceptual arguments. Once constructed the theoretical and 
conceptual sections of the paper formed a framework for a further literature search to identify 
further sources of the empirical evidence that underpins the arguments presented.  
 
Peer review – The development of the paper is supported by a steering group and each 
section has both DFID peer reviewers and external peer reviewers. At each stage of the 
process – from the identification of the focus areas to the drafting of the final documents the 
peer reviewers have contributed their assessments and suggestions relating to the 
representativeness and strength of the evidence base that we are drawing from.  
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Annex 3:  Critical appraisal  
For a full description of the methods used for critical appraisal in this paper please refer to 
the DFID How To Note on Assessing the Strength of Evidence.   
 
The basic criteria for assessing the quality of the studies cited in this paper are summarised 
in the table below: 
 
Principles of 
quality 
Associated principles YES/NO 
Conceptual 
framing 
Does the study acknowledge existing research?  
Does the study construct a conceptual framework?  
Does the study pose a research question?  
Does the study outline a hypothesis?  
Openness and 
transparency 
Does the study present the raw data it analyses?  
Does the author recognise limitations/weaknesses in 
their work? 
 
Appropriateness 
and rigour 
Does the study identify a research design?  
Does the study identify a research method?  
Does the study demonstrate why the chosen design 
and method are good ways to explore the research 
question? 
 
Validity 
Has the study demonstrated measurement validity?  
Is the study internally valid?  
Is the study externally valid?   
Reliability 
Has the study demonstrated measurement reliability?  
Has the study demonstrated that its selected analytical 
technique is reliable?  
 
Cogency 
Does the author ‘signpost’ the reader throughout?  
Are the conclusions clearly based on the study’s 
results? 
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